The Satgas Mafia Hukum - Law Mafia Eradication Task Force

Monday, April 19, 2010

 

Controversial events have surrounded the formation of special commissions by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Such special commissions have thus far been created in the context of the President’s anti-corruption efforts and good governance election platform.

The question is how these commissions will fare against the backdrop of Indonesia’s very robust network of rent-seekers and thugs dependent on the culture of corruption.

Past experiences show that previous special commissions may be successful in the short term, but soon become submerged in the culture of corruption. The stakes are high during this new phase in Indonesia’s reform era.

 

Shift in How Special Commissions are Perceived in Indonesia

During Suharto’s New Order era, special comissions, usually formed to solve a problem that has spiralled out of control, were generally viewed by the public with a mixture of pessimism and apathy.

For example, the Indonesian government had tried to tackle the problem of corruption even as far back as the fifties, usually every time a particularly eggregious corruption crime was accidentally revealed, or blatantly committed. The life cycle of such proto anti-corruption commissions follow a set pattern of early successes followed by neutralization and even subversion by the rest of the regime, whereupon the venture would be abandoned.

A decade on since the beginning of the reform era, however, Indonesia seemed to have started to buck that trend. The Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi – the “KPK”) has proved so far to be resilient against the normal methods of neutralization and subversion used by corruptors. The latest example of this resilience is the success of Commissioners Chandra M. Hamzah and Bibit Samad Rianto’s deflection of a conspiracy involving officers of the Police, of the Attorney General’s Office as well as a collection of black lawyers and businessmen.

In fact, the Bibit-Chandra case, as it later became known, became a springboard for another special team: the Team Eight, which was formed by the President after a massive public outcry over the arrests of the Commissioners by the Police over extremely flimsy grounds. Team Eight focused its work on establishing whether or not there was a conspiracy to weaken the KPK by abusing Article 32(c) of Law Number 30 of 2002 on the Corruption Crimes Eradication Commission, which states that Commissioners who are charged with a crime shall be summarily dismissed. Team Eight found that the case against the Commissioners were fabricated by a so-called Justice Mafia, and in its final report to the President urged that the cases be stopped. This finding in turn inspired the formation of the Justice Mafia Eradication Work Unit (Satuan Tugas Pemberantasan Mafia Keadilan – the “Satgas”) by Presidential Decision.

The Keppres further provides that the Satgas was to be lead by Kuntoro Mangkusubroto, who previously headed the Aceh Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency (Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi Aceh – “BRR”). Denny Indrayana, the President’s special advisor in legal matters, who also was a member of Team Eight, would serve as Secretary.

Because the Satgas is “in good hands”, there is an expectation of the public that they will make great accomplishments.

[A]lthough these sentiments are vital in mobilizing public sentiment against the holdovers of the old regime who still play a central role in keeping corrupt systems alive, there is a risk that the short term successes of these special teams would echo those experienced by the above-mentioned special anti-corruption commissions, and may direct attention and resources away from the hard work that needs to be done to institute real change.

[W]hen such special commissions fail to contribute to long term change, especially when they are headed by people who inspire confidence, the public will grow more apathetic and despondent, and therefore more prone to believe that things cannot change. The tendency to passively accept corrupt regimes is then perpetuated.

[P]roponents of real legal reforms in Indonesia will need to stay alert and maintain an anticipatory approach in dealing with the machinations of the corrupt bloc.

The only way to maintain a periodical output of consistently high standards is to keep the furnace burning and maintain intense public attention on anti-corruption reform and human rights issues. Even as the corruption bloc maintains a shadowy support network between themselves, so the reform movement must focus a substantial part of its efforts to consolidate and coordinate themselves within a reform network that crosses public-private-NGO and even local-international borders.

 

There is no Crystal Ball

We in Indonesia are now living in very special times; a time of great hope and also great risk in terms of the future of legal certainty and the success of democracy as well as good governance. The recent cases of Bibit-Chandra and Bank Century must be seen as important test cases and stepping stones towards a more active and powerful civil society movement that in turn must infiltrate the core of the Indonesian government; this is the only solution to Indonesia’s oppression by the culture of corruption.

That special commissions such as Team Eight and the Satgas have been formed because of the aforementioned cases might be a hopeful sign that the old corrupt regime and the holdovers of Suharto’s empire are deeply inept at handling an awakened but effective civil society; or it could simply mean that the corrupt blocs have not yet finished consolidating themselves into a pyramid of greed from the rubble leftover by Suharto’s lengser.

The lesson of the day, therefore, is to strike while the iron is hot, make networks amongst anti-corruption enthusiasts and seize the opportunities created by the special commissions and exploit them as far as possible. After all, why should the black mafia have all the fun? It’s our party now and they are not invited.

 

Hippolyta Hall is a lawyer focusing in the areas of corporate law and white-collar crime.

The complete original paper is available HERE.